This question has already attracted some attention from legal scholars, and the most common conjecture is that the real driving force behind the Racial and Religious
Hatred Act 2006 was for the Labour government to provide a sop to Muslims: to take with one hand from British Muslims, in the shape of draconian anti-terrorism laws, but give back with the other, in the form of protection against the stirring up of religious hated. 2 Yet there has also been a lack of systematic, historical analysis of the question: both in terms of testing the validity of the sop explanation and in terms of identifying and assessing rival explanations. This article is in some small way an attempt to put that right. I am partly engaged, therefore, in a critique of the explanations found in the existing literature on this subject, but also partly concerned with evaluating potential explanations identified for the purposes of this inquiry.
Why does an inquiry into events of more than a decade ago matter? I believe that it is inherently important to try to understand something of the politics behind the introduction of the new offences as an exercise in political history. But no doubt this investigation has other potentially significant implications, including gaining a better understanding of the true scope of anti-terrorism policy agendas in England and Wales, re-evaluating the nature of the New Labour project, uncovering inconsistencies in the Prevent strategy, shedding light on the political position of the Muslim community in England and Wales, or even testing general theories of public policy and the dynamics of legislative change. However, my own particular interest is in teasing out how the best explanation of the true purpose behind the stirring up religious hatred offences bears on the many normative arguments that have been made about the rights and wrongs of these laws, including arguments about further extensions covering transgender identity and disability. I shall argue that although it might be perfectly possible to normatively evaluate these laws without understanding the real functions they were and are supposed to serve, it is much harder to do so in ways that stand a decent chance of impacting future governmental, parliamentary and judicial decisions.
This article tries to explain the politics behind the introduction of the new stirring Nevertheless, one general point worth emphasising here is that since any public policy, including public policy on hate speech, is constituted not only by legislative acts that implement the will of the government but also by constitutional protections In what follows I present and critically evaluate each of the aforementioned explanations in turn. In the end I come down on the side of a pluralistic approach, one that combines the public order explanation with the client politics explanation in conjunction with the parity of protection explanation, whilst deemphasising the sop explanation and the anti-terrorism explanation. Finally, I try to spell out some implications of this largely historical analysis for how legal scholars today argue about and seek to normatively reject or defend incitement to hatred laws and the extension thereof to new categories of people.
Before I begin, however, I also want to make the crucial methodological point that when it comes to the interpretation of events dating back over a decade we are certainly not in the terrain of incontrovertible evidence. That is why I shall not say that the public policy on incitement to religious hatred we have in England and Wales cannot possibly have the chief purpose that a given explanation claims for it based on the available evidence. It is more a matter of sifting through the evidence and taking it as a whole. There are no smoking guns here, merely a balance of probabilities.
The public order explanation
The public order explanation draws strength from the history surrounding the introduction of the racial hatred offences. Both the tenets and the practices of various religious denominations are the subject of violent differences and of perfectly legitimate controversy. There is all the difference in the world between attacking a section of the public because of the colour of their skins and attacking them because, say, they subscribe to the Thirty-Nine Articles. 3 He also claimed that it would be unnecessary.
I agree − we all agree − that nothing is more loathsome and more contemptible than expressions of anti-Semitism. But those expressions are not, at any rate in 99 cases out of 100, based on theological considerations.
When there are attacks upon the Jews […] they are not directed merely against those who observe the Mosaic law. They are directed against Jews as a race. 4 In fact, the idea of including religion within the scope of the stirring up hatred offences never disappeared entirely from parliamentary debates on issues of race relations for the next two decades. 5 But the idea continuously butted up against the sorts of objections articulated above by Dingle Mackintosh Foot.
In the meantime, Britain continued to see mass disturbances and riots. According to the public order explanation, the introduction of the legislation was a direct response to, and triggered by, the fact that mass disturbances and riots were not going away and were becoming increasingly more complex, meaning religion could no longer be left out of the equation in understanding them. Moreover, the inclusion of the stirring up religious hatred offences within the Public Order Act 1986 was not mere convenience but went to the heart of the real function of the offences.
From the perspective of process tracing, it is difficult to argue with the timings of the various events described above, with the putative causes and effects in their correct temporal sequences. On this explanation, one looks at these events in terms of an evolving public policy response to an evolving problem: as mass disturbances and riots (public disorder) became more complex, so did the public policy response, in the shape of new public order offences.
In addition, the speeches of successive Home Secretaries clearly indicate a concern with public order. As David Blunkett put the matter when addressing the Of course, it might be countered that just because the Home Secretary referred to the public order nature of these offences it does not prove that the government definitely did not see these offences as also potentially being used to prevent the spread of extremist ideologies or acts of terrorism, for example. Indeed, the very concept of public order is not necessarily limited to mass disturbances and riots. I take the point.
This bit of evidence is not conclusive. But the real issue is whether or not the evidence as a whole suggests that public order was the primary concern. The aforementioned evidence suggests that it was.
The public order explanation is also borne out in some of the ensuing case law. Muslim communities in Leicester. At heart, this case was about a concern on the part of the police, the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), the Attorney General and Judge
Dean about public order − a concern that the use of threatening words on Facebook could further heighten tensions between these ethno-religious groups and lead to violence and mass disturbances. Indeed, it is notable that the defendants were also convicted of various offences relating to the importing and possession of dangerous weapons including knives, knuckledusters, Tasers, pepper sprays, and batons, and to persuading people to travel to various locations around Leicester carrying these weapons. The two groups were gearing up for a mêlée on the streets of Leicester during which they and innocent members of the public could get hurt. That the court 8 treated the problems being tackled by the offences as principally public order problems tells us something of the real function of the wider public policy on incitement to religious hatred.
Despite all this, however, the public order explanation is not the dominant explanation in the literature. In fact, it hardly receives a mention next to the explanation which is dominant, to which I shall now turn.
The sop explanation
The dominant account of the real function of, or explanation for, the new stirring up religious offences runs as follows. In the 1960s the government set out to restrict immigration -as a response to concerns about the threat to social cohesion posed by excessive immigration -but to balance off the negative impact of these restrictions on existing immigrant families it also created the stirring up racial hatred offences, as a way of protecting these groups. clear that the offence is taken extremely seriously due in large measure to the threat that the stirring up of racial hatred will lead impressionable people to take up arms. As he put it:
In my judgment, your offending was aggravated by the fact that as a cleric you were sent to this country to preach and minister to the Muslim community in London, and so had a responsibility to the young and impressionable within that community at times of conflict abroad and understandable tensions in the communities here over the period which is spanned by the indictment. Instead of calming fears, you fanned the flames of hostility, and furthermore, as I have said already, your words were not confined to the study circles you addressed but recorded to be distributed to bookshops for sale to the public, packaged as they were in the tape covers which were exhibited in the course of this trial, and to me it rang hollow for you to say in evidence that none of the young men to whom you preached years. In passing sentence Justice Royce used phrases such as 'your views were corrosively dangerous', 'a significant risk to members of the public', 'public protection', 'a viper in our midst willing to get as many as possible to strike at the heart of Parliament and of our system'. 26 Whilst many of these phrases were clearly aimed at the more serious offences, the judge does not explicitly exclude the stirring up religious hatred offences from the scope of these phrases, nor does the overall thrust of the sentencing remarks point toward that restriction of scope. What all of this shows is that there was indeed potentially a gap in the law which meant that prior to -Foster hatred which might lead to inter-community violence in the UK. 27 The then Prime Minister, Tony Blair, explicitly linked these new measures to 'the terrorist threat in Britain' and to 'national security'. 28 The Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed.
It confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government policy to prevent terrorism. 33 Given this statement, it could seem indicative that, as well as discussing a range of anti-terrorism measures, this same Prevent Strategy document also throws into the mix the stirring up offences. 'Powers derived from public order-related legislation, for example, can address activity which contributes to stirring up racial or religious hatred or hatred on grounds of sexual orientation.' 34 The implication here (so defenders of the anti-terrorism explanation might argue) is that the Conservative government views the stirring up of hatred as part of government policy to prevent terrorism rather than policy to promote integration.
The anti-terrorism explanation faces some not insignificant problems, however. Ahmed had himself argued that the inclusion of the new offence within an antiterrorism law was not merely a red-hearing but could unwittingly create a pernicious association in the minds of people about terrorism and religion that ought to be avoided. In his words:
The British Muslims are wary that they will be segregated from society because of their religious beliefs, especially in the light of recent world events. If we are to include religion under the same umbrella as terrorism, then it is inevitable that some people may consider certain religious beliefs to be a form of terrorism. We do not want to see that happen. While I strongly support religious discrimination laws, I propose that that should be a separate
Bill. This is necessary to avoid any misunderstanding between the two issues and to emphasise that the Government are wholly supportive of the need to improve religious relations. 39 In a similar vein, Lord Dholakia suggested to his colleagues during the same debate that even the coincidental inclusion of new stirring up religious hatred offences with an anti-terrorism law could potentially undermine an important distinction.
There is also concern about the security of all communities in Britain. The
Government have rightly recognised that, but they have done so in the wrong context. Religious hatred, particularly when it is directed at minorities, has existed from the time when minorities set foot in this country. The events of 11th September are not required to recognise that. We on these Benches find it difficult to accept that the Bill is the right place for such legislation. We are not alone in that − even the Commission for Racial Equality argues that a distinction can be made between anti-terrorism measures that can be justified as necessary in the current emergency situation and those that have wider implications and which should be given greater consideration in Parliament. Perhaps insufficient care is taken here to make the point that some "hate preachers"
were excluded on national security grounds whereas other "hate preachers" were excluded because their presence here would not have been conducive to the public good, such as if they posed a risk to public order, say. But nevertheless the fact that these two grounds for exclusion are separated gives a strong indication that the real function, as well as the actual practice, of immigration rules allowing the Home Secretary to exclude people who stir up hatred, cannot be exclusively related to the prevention of terrorism. Put crudely, if 61 people were excluded on national security grounds but 84 "hate preachers" were excluded, it stands to reason that at least some "hate preachers" must have been excluded for reasons other than national security.
The client politics explanation
Yet another explanation appeals to the idea of client politics. 43 We were approached by leaders of the Muslim community − it was a representative leadership group − who thought that it was only right, fair and protective to include religion with race in terms of avoiding incitement to hate using the Public Order Act 1986. I considered that and decided that their point was fair and reasonable. and audience interests in free public discourse on matters concerning religious believers as well as religious beliefs), minority religious groups would be acutely aware of the cost of other people enjoying the freedom to stir up hatred against them and so would be particularly motivated to persuade politicians to legislate. In that sense the real function of, and true explanation for, the new stirring up religious hatred offences was to serve the interests of Muslim clients and thereby to serve the interests of politicians standing for election in constituency containing these clients.
Two factual premises need to be substantiated, therefore. The first is that Muslims did lobby the government for a change in the law. This premise seems entirely 23 unproblematic. The evidence suggests, not least from the testimony of parliamentarians, that a many Muslim groups and leaders did assert that they were suffering from an increase in hate speech post 9/11 and 7/7 and did lobby their MPs and the government for new stirring up religious hatred offences as part of the solution. Of course, it is also the case that some Muslims argued against the introduction of the new offences precisely because they seemed to be another way of putting Muslims to the forefront of the public's consciousness, and not in a good way.
But this need not in itself undermine the client politics explanation. It is enough that some Muslim groups did mobilise in favour of the legislation because it represented a net benefit to them.
The second premise is that this lobbying resulted from the facts on the ground.
For the client politics explanation to work it must actually be the case that there was a disproportionate burden of incitement to hatred on a particular group (Muslims), as well as a concentrated benefit to be had from legal protection also for that group, with costs in freedom expression diffusely distributed across the general population. With regards to this premise, however, the main problem for the client politics explanation is a lack of tailored evidence. introduced by the Lords, not by the government. The government took that view that the legislation offered adequate protections of free speech already, and so the clause was redundant. But the government did not succeed in overturning the Lords amendment in the commons. In short, the will of the government and the will of the Houses of Parliament pointed in different directions and the government did not get its way. 62 All of these mitigating factors working together could mean that the client politics explanation is not undermined by the low conviction rates, after all.
Since the hate crime statistics and the case law neither establishes nor discredits the premise that Muslims were disproportionately burdened with incitement to hatred, however, it does remain a possibility that at the time Muslims were merely one group among many others who experienced a similar burden from incitement to hatred. In fact, some other relevant evidence points to exactly this situation. If the burden of incitement to hatred was actually diffusely distributed among numerous minority groups, then this suggest that numerous, well-organised interest groups would be The Bill seeks to address the anomaly that means that Jews and Sikhs are protected under the existing law, but that other faith groups, and people of no faith, are not protected. I think that that is simply not right and that the problem needs to be addressed. A cleric who urged followers to kill non-believers, Americans, Hindus and Jews was jailed, first, for seven years for incitement to commit murder, and then an extra two years were added for incitement to racial hatred. If he had chosen his words more carefully and excluded Jews from this incitement, he would have been given only seven years and not nine.
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Although Lord Avebury did not specify, it is highly likely from his description of the case and the sentence handed down that he was referring to El-Faisal. if the government's core motivation when dealing with these policy issues really was to provide parity, then why did it allow uneven protection on this other matter? 88 Finally, the parity of protection explanation cannot explain why the stirring up racial hatred offence was introduced in the first place.
No doubt it is easier to reply to some of these problems than to others. The point about blasphemy laws, for example, is straightforwardly undercut by the fact that the Nevertheless, the problem about the anomaly being resolved through repeal rather than extension might be countered by saying that although the real driving force is a concern for parity of protection, that principle itself is likely to be embedded in a deeper principle of good administration, whereby governments seek higher-order consistency in the enactment of criminal law, that is, the principle of treating like reasons alike (and unalike reasons unalike). For example, one possible reason for banning incitement to racial hatred is that certain kinds of racist hate speech can contribute to climates of hatred and fear. Applying this same rationale to the case of Muslims could justify the course of action of extending hate speech law to cover religion, based on a parallel concern that stirring up hatred against Muslims can contribute to climates of hatred and fear, rather than the course of action of repealing law. 89 Alternatively, it might be that concern for parity of protection is actually Or perhaps the parity of protection explanation needs to be combined with other explanations in order to explain why future extensions have not occurred. In any event, it will need to be augmented with other explanations in order to explain why the stirring up racial hatred offences were introduced in the first place.
Following on from this, it seems to me that surely the correct response to these problems, and the best approach full stop, is to explain the real function, and true explanation for, the new stirring up religious hatred offences in a pluralistic way.
A pluralistic explanation
A pluralistic explanation of the rise and purpose of the stirring up religious hatred offences proceeds on the basis that there is nothing inconsistent in explaining the original creation of the stirring up racial hatred offences in one way, explaining the stirring up religious hatred offences in a different, more complex way, and explaining the failure of government to introduce yet more stirring up hatred offences in another way again.
The pluralistic explanation might run thusly. First, a significant part of the impetus for the creation of the stirring up racial hatred offences was ethnic tensions and race riots following a period increased immigration (the public order explanation).
Second, the Labour government introduced the stirring up religious hatred offences partly because it had concerns about public order in the wake of increasingly complex racial, ethnic and religious mass disturbances and riots (the public order explanation). Another part had to do with how Muslims, in particular, had mobilised as lobbyists, not necessarily because they were disproportionately burdened by hate speech, but instead because of an acute awareness that they did not enjoy the same legal protections as other groups (the client politics explanation combined with the parity of protection explanation). In other words, the relevant burden partly consisted in the fact that Muslims were being treated, and believed that they were being treated, as second-class citizens by the law. Consider, once again, the letter that was allegedly sense the letter − assuming it did exist, and was in fact sent to mosques − was making an appeal to Muslim clients. But the crucial point here is that the burden it acknowledged was not an increase in anti-Muslim hate speech post 9/11 but instead an appreciation that Muslims were being treated differently than Jews and Sikhs when it came to legal protections against the stirring up of hatred (the client politics explanation combined with the parity of protection explanation).
Third, when questions emerge about why other stirring up hatred offences have yet to be introduced, such as for transgender identity and disability, these questions require complex answers. It is may be true that currently the burden of incitement to hatred is diffusely distributed among numerous minority groups, and this has created a number of interest groups seeking further extensions of the stirring up hatred offences (the umbrella of interest groups explanation). And it may also be true that the government is inclined to want to undo anomalies in the cover provided by the existing offences (the parity of protection explanation). However, actual mass disturbances and riots in England and Wales have not evolved, yet, to include dimensions relating to transgender identity and disability (the public order explanation), and various other factors relating to Brexit mean that the government's attention is currently taken up elsewhere (endogenous explanations).
Implications
I have argued that the best explanation not merely of why we ended up with the Racial and Religious Hatred Act 2006 but also the ongoing point and purpose of the stirring up hatred offences is likely to be pluralistic, and that our understanding is hindered rather than helped by the terrorisation of these offences, so to speak. In this section I want to briefly explore the implications of this conclusion for normative debates about hate speech laws and freedom of expression going forward.
The main point I want to make is that it matters what types of normative arguments academics and others are presenting to governments about why they should retain the stirring up hatred offences or even extend them further. The wrong types of arguments are those which are in tension with the best explanations of governmental intentions in this field of policymaking, potentially making them doomed to failure. Of course, one possible response to the tension is simply to deny that it matters: the right arguments are the right arguments and so it is up to those people who believe that the stirring up hatred offences should be extended, say, to convince governments to embrace their way of thinking. A second response, to which I more sympathetic, is that legal and political theorists, if they want to change the world, have every reason, when presenting normative arguments to governments, to present whichever, already good arguments best match the government's way of thinking.
So what normative arguments could potentially play well with the Conservative government on the issue of extending the stirring up hatred offences to include transgender identity and disability? Predictably, one potential argument would emphasise people's right to parity of protection. Put simply, if two similar groups of people are subject to similar forms of incitement to hatred, but one of the groups enjoys legal protections against such speech whereas the other group does not, then the other group has a prima facie right to similar protection also. 91 As Alon Harel puts it, 'treating the victims of racist speech more favorably than victims of sexist, homophobic, or other forms of abhorrent speech is itself a form of discrimination.' 92 Another potentially important argument combines the right to parity of protection with an argument based on the public assurance of civic dignity. According to Jeremy
Waldron, certain sorts of group libel and incitement to hatred laws could be warranted if they help to protect people's sense that they are members of society in good standing, the sort of assurance that can be undone when they are confronted by public hate speech which downgrades or denigrates them. 93 It strikes me that the threat to assurance could be especially high where certain groups realise that they lack the legal protections against incitement to hatred that other groups enjoy. If people with transgender identities or disabilities, for example, see that they lack the legal protections that various faith communities and gays and lesbians have benefited from, then this may compound the harmful effects of the incitement to hatred they endure.
Both the incitement to hatred and the failure of parliament to act against it could leave people with transgender identities or disabilities feeling that they are second-class citizens. In other words, lack of parity of protection could be particularly devastating for their sense of assurance that they are members of society in good standing. 94 However, anyone who wants to persuade the government to extend the stirring up hatred offences must also clear away barriers that the government currently recognises, as previous governments have recognised, for not extending these offences. First among these barriers is freedom of expression. Examples of laws banning incitement to hatred can be found not just in England and Wales but also in domestic penal codes and various other legal instruments in countries across the globe. 95 Yet these laws continue to be subject to fierce criticism, especially, although inherent differences between race and religion which made the former but not the latter worth of protection under incitement to hatred legislation, and on their perception that the latter posed a special threat to freedom of expression. 97 Others, myself included, tried to make the counter case for the extension. 98 Nevertheless, what nearly all sides in this debate agree about is that if a plausible case is going to be made for extending incitement to hatred laws still further, then only the strongest, principled arguments will do; anything less would be easily defeated by principled arguments on the side of free speech.
But what are the strongest arguments? More importantly, are any of the strongest arguments likely to chime with the best explanations of why governments have in the past extended the stirring up hatred offences and why the Conservative government might do so in the future? One potential argument is that laws banning the stirring up of hatred on grounds of transgender identity or disability can be warranted insofar as the stirring up of hatred against these groups contributes to a climate of hatred in which hate crimes are more likely, and to a climate of fear, in which individual members of these groups suffer debilitating fear that they could become the victims of hate crime. 99 This sort of argument might chime with the umbrella of interest groups explanation. In the event that the burden of incitement to hatred is diffusely distributed among numerous minority groups, including people with transgender identities or disabilities, this could create a number of interest groups seeking further extensions of the stirring up hatred offences. The present argument speaks to the sort of burdens faced by members of these minority groups. It could also be useful to the relevant interest groups in putting their case to government; provided, that is, evidence can be found that substantiates the arguments linking incitement to hatred with climates of hatred and fear and linking those climates with hate crimes, say.
I also do not think that arguments which speak to public order, and therefore, march in step with the public order explanation, are out of the question. No doubt defenders of the status quo could react by saying that our society has experienced religious wars and race riots, but not violent public explosions of simmering tensions between cisgender and transgender people, and not rioting by people with disabilities.
In other words, it may be that mass disturbances and riots in England and Wales have yet to evolve to include the dimensions of transgender identity and disability, along with the dimensions of race, ethnicity and religion. However, arguably this was also not the case with sexual orientation. Yet the government did not wait for mass disturbances to occur involving violence between religious conservatives and homosexuals, say, before extending the legislation to cover sexual orientation. The risk was enough. This is also borne out in the case law. In R. v. Ali, Javed, and Ahmed, 100 for example, three Muslim men became the first people to be successfully prosecuted for offences relating to the stirring up of hatred on grounds of sexual orientation in England and Wales. Acting together the men distributed leaflets on the streets of Derby titled 'Turn or Burn', 'GAY -God Abhors You', 'Death Penalty?' as a protest to the Gay Pride Festival taking place that day. In his sentencing remarks Judge Burgess used the language of public order: 'the vast majority of us get along together very well', 'the greatest freedom that we all enjoy is to live in peace and without fear', 'It was clearly perceived by parliament that people of a particular sexual orientation needed protection from that minority who wished to stir up hatred against them', 'your intention was to do great harm in a peaceful community'.
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According to a more subtle version of the public order explanation, therefore, the government will, under the right circumstances, introduce laws banning the stirring up of hatred in response to the risk of mass disturbances and riots that have taken on more complex dimensions. So one potentially impactful line of normative argument might be that the stirring up of hatred against people with transgender identities or disabilities has the potential to become tomorrow's Bradford riots, in any parts of the country with significant proportions of such people, and taking a precautionary approach to the avoidance of such public disorder can warrant a change in the law.
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